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Abstract 
Conflict prevention has become an important doctrine within conflict management policies in 
international and regional organizations, especially since the end of the Cold War. There has 
been an evolution in the last three decades in the context of peace and security that has made 
conflict prevention gains relevance. In the current context, with the arrival of António Guterres 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), conflict prevention doctrine could be 
encouraged, since he has pointed out that it should be the priority of the organization.  
Conflict prevention offers several advantages to face crisis contexts, since it works on avoiding 
violence situations escalating towards armed conflicts and helping to control the spread of 
security threats. By using preventive measures, the structural causes of conflicts can be dealt 
with in the most durable and efficient manner since the final goal of preventive actions is to 
transform actually or potentially violent conflict into non-violent processes of social and 
political change. 
While conflict prevention has gained greater importance, another trend has been promoted; 
security regionalization. Since the mid-nineties, there has been a transition in international 
peacekeeping missions, aimed to warrant peace and security all over the world that has 
focused on regional actors. This practice has been particularly welcomed in Africa. 
Both trends –conflict prevention and security regionalization– will be the object of study in 
this article, using as a practical scenario the region of West Africa. It is a geographic area 
where a series of cross-border threats are concentrated, hence becoming a zone of 
international concern. Moreover, the experience on conflict prevention of the regional 
organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is interesting. 
Indeed, ECOWAS has carried out a significant activity regarding preventive diplomacy and 
mediation in conflicts. 
Thus, the objectives of this research are: (1) to study the evolution of conflict prevention 
doctrine; (2) to assess the link between conflict prevention policies and security 
regionalization; and (3) to use the case of ECOWAS as an illustration, since the organization 
is at the forefront of conflict prevention iniciatives in the African continent. 
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1. Introduction 
The dynamics of the armed conflicts that have taken place since the decade of the 
nineties have forced the development of different measures capable of addressing the 
challenges that arise in the international scenario. Thus, the advances made in conflict 
management respond to the changes in the normative and conceptual framework, 
marked by the need to solve a series of increasingly complex contexts.  
In this sense, policies aiming at prevention are an indispensable tool for the management 
of armed conflicts, since they can help to control the spread of security threats. This set 
of measures works on preventing situations of violence and insecurity that can lead to 
an armed conflict as well as transforming those situations in which there are factors that 
threaten the safety of people and turning them into peaceful and stable processes (García 
Izquierdo, 2002).  
Despite the advantages offered by this type of measures, as it is the “most pragmatic 
and cost-effective option” (United Nations, 2015, p.4), it has not received much 
attention, overshadowed by others measures that focus on more direct actions, such as 
peacekeeping missions. However, this doctrine could acquire more interest in the future 
from the UN, especially since the arrival of the new Secretary General, António Guterres, 
on 1 January 2017, who proposes to return to the origins of the organization, which was 
founded with the objective of taking “effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, article 1). 
In this context, the article tries to emphasize, firstly, the need to assess prevention as 
one of the priorities in the field of security and peace, since it offers important advantages 
for the management of situations of violence and conflict. Secondly, it also aims to 
highlight an aspect considered essential for the progress of prevention policies: the 
promotion of the regionalization of security. In the nineties, with the end of the Cold War, 
theories about regional security began to emerge, since new actors appeared in the 
international scene that presented a “challenge to international relations (IR) theory” and 
                                                     
1  Special issue of articles presented at the 1st International Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace 
Studies that took place at UAL on the 29th and 30th of November 2018. 
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that “revolves around the autonomy of a regional level of analysis between the state and 
the globe” (Kelly, 2007, p.197).  
Thus, this article tries to answer the question of wether regional actors can play a 
fundamental role in the prevention of conflicts within their regional security complexes 
(Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998) and how they do it. For this purpose, the case of ECOWAS 
is analysed, as a regional organization with experience in conflict prevention. 
The paper is structured in four sections. Firstly, it defines the concept of conflict 
prevention and examines its evolution in the last three decades. Secondly, the 
phenomenon of security regionalization is studied, with special attention to the African 
continent. Thirdly, the article will focus on the case of ECOWAS and its experience in 
conflict prevention. Finally, some of the conclusions of the research on conflict prevention 
are presented. 
 
2. The (re)emergence of a culture of prevention? 
What is conflict prevention? 
In this article, the concept of conflict prevention is understood as the set of measures 
that are destined to: avoid the triggering of violence; avoid an active conflict worsens; 
and that works over contexts before tensions arise. It pursues, as the ultimate goal, the 
transformation of “real or potentially violent conflicts into peaceful processes of political 
and social change” (Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011, p.113). 
Although conflict prevention is especially applied at the beginning of the conflict, when 
tensions and disputes are escalating into violent conflict (graphic 1), it must be present 
throughout the crisis. The efforts should be focus not only on trying to contain or stop a 
situation of armed violence, but also on resolving the factors that lead to that situation.  
 
Graph 1. Phases of conflict in the Lund conflict curve 
 
Source: Lund (1993, p.38). 
 
Preventive policies are developed from different areas (from the community, from the 
local level, from national governments or from international spheres), so there is a wide 
range of possibilities to used them. From tools such as preventive diplomacy, good offices 
and mediation as preventive instruments in situations of war, it has been an evolution 
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into another type of more complete actions, adapted to the complexity of the current 
contexts.  
This is how they were classified2 in the Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflicts, entitled Preventing Deadly Conflict (Carnegie Corporation of 
New York, 1997) –a document of reference–, which distinguished between: 
- Operational measures, which are launched in the face of an impending crisis. They 
act against risk factors and are direct and short-term measures. 
- Structural measures, which address the sources of conflicts, the underlying causes, 
and involve broad and long-term change processes. These are measures for 
economic, social and political stability. 
 
This is the categorization used by most studies, but the concept of conflict prevention as 
well as its scope of action have generated an intense and interesting debate ‒which is 
not the object of study of this article‒, giving rise to different interpretations on what is 
and is not the prevention of conflicts (Menkhaus, 2004; Lund, 2009, p.289; Igaripé 
Institute, 2018). 
Preventive measures, both operational and structural, represent an interesting field of 
action in the management of troubled contexts and they can be employed simultaneously 
throughout the conflict cycle. This is the case of preventive diplomacy, which took up an 
important place in the UN’s agenda in the nineties. This concept is living a resurgence in 
the present, (United Nations, 2017a). Preventive diplomacy is very useful at the first 
stage of the conflict cycle, since it works before violence erupts through good offices and 
negotiations, when a third party assists to parties in conflict to solve their problems. In 
these cases, the role played by highly respected personalities in the international political 
sphere is key. For instance, one of the main organs within ECOWAS peace and security 
architecture is the Council of the Wise, made up of eminent personalities who act as 
mediators (El Abdellaoui, 2009). Preventive diplomacy has been a very common practice 
in conflictual electoral contexts –with more or less success–; such as in some cases in 
West Africa, such as Côte d’Ivoire (2011), Senegal (2012), Nigeria (2015) or Gambia 
(2017). Preventive diplomacy has also been used after coups d’États, like in Mali 2012. 
As a kind of coercitive diplomatic measure, economic sanctions –authorized by the Article 
41 of the UN Charter– are used when tensions have arisen and there is an overt crisis. 
They are used when mediation do not work and before considering a military intervention. 
They have been used at different types of conflicts, from Liberia, to Sierra Leone, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau or Mali.  
When conflict is imminent, preventive deployment becomes a useful tool as a dissuasive 
measure. There has been much discussion regarding the maintenance of a rapid-
deployment peacekeeping force in different international and regional organizations 
(Darkwa, 2017; Lotze, 2015; Rappa, 2017). In West Africa there is the ECOWAS Standby 
Force that it is part of the African Union Standby Force (ASF), which is “a multi-
disciplinary, continental peacekeeping force comprised of military, police and civilian 
components, which are on standby in their regions of origin and available to the African 
                                                     
2 This classification is then adopted by other institutions like the UN, the European Union (EU) or the African 
Union (AU). 
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Union for deployment in times of crisis” (Institute for Security Studies, 2015). This option 
was used in Gambia, for example, through the deployment of the Economic Community 
of West African States Military Intervention in Gambia (ECOMIG) to enforce the election 
results in 2017, with a positive impact (Hartmann, 2017). 
This type of measures, applied before the armed conflict breaks out, are operational and 
direct; however, it is even more important to develop structural measures at the first 
signs of tensions as well as throughout the entire cycle of the conflict. Actions focus on 
the underlying factors of tensions are critical in contexts of political violence. These are 
measures aimed at economic, political and social stability, whose development entails 
longer-term plans than operational measures, and they focus on aspects like governance, 
development and human rights (De Carvalho, 2017). However, in this article the focus is 
on the operational measures. 
 
Evolution and future  
Until recently, preventive policies have been relegated to a second place on the agendas 
of international and regional organizations, where attention has been directed 
predominantly towards the contexts of active civil wars as well as to the activities of post-
conflict reconstruction. 
However, since the end of the Cold War, conflict prevention has begun gaining a greater 
role in the conflict management policies of international and regional organizations 
(Cuadrado, 2018; Ramsbotham, Miall & Woodhouse, 2011), as evidenced by the more 
often reference to it in the official documents3. Thus, regional organizations ‒such as 
ECOWAS‒ have made conflict prevention one of their priorities.  
Studies on the prevention of armed conflicts have proliferated in the last three decades, 
marked by the failure of the UN in the nineties to anticipate and respond effectively to 
contexts such as Somalia, Bosnia or Rwanda (United Nations, 2014a). These 
humanitarian catastrophes showed the importance of prevention and the need to 
overcome a culture of reaction, where actions take place after the violence has broken 
out, which has featured the history of the UN (Dorn & Matloff, 2000). 
Since the former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, adopted the concept of 
‘culture of prevention’ in his report entitled Prevention of Armed Conflict, of June 2001, 
where he already talked about passing ‘culture of reaction’ and advancing to a ‘culture 
of prevention’, there has been an evolution. Conflict prevention has lived different stages, 
ups and downs. 
Currently, it can be said that there is a new enthusiasm for prevention. In the agenda of 
the present Secretary General, António Guterres, prevention occupies a high priority 
(Leone, 2017). As the Secretary General has reflected, “the world spends much more 
                                                     
3 For example, the Report of the Secretary General entitled Armed Conflict Prevention of 2001, where a 
classification of the type of preventive measures is made, Security Council Resolution 1366 of August 30, 2001 
on the role of the Council in the prevention of armed conflicts, the Report of the General Assembly (A / RES / 
57/337) of July 18, 2003 on the prevention of armed conflicts, or the Secretary-General's Report on the 
implementation of the Security Council resolution 1625 (2005) on the prevention of conflicts, in particular in 
Africa, of 2008. 
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energy and resources managing crises than preventing them. Thus the UN must uphold 
a strategic commitment to a ‘culture of prevention’” (United Nations, 2016, p.3). 
In spite of this new enthusiasm that seems to exist within the UN for the prevention of 
conflicts, there are important barriers that can hinder its success and that must be 
overcome in the future. The reality is that “the Security Council's agenda is already 
overburdened by managing ongoing conflicts [which] makes […] difficult […] to devote 
time to crises bubbling below the surface” (Roberts, 2017). 
Traditionally, the attention has been put on the management of immediate crises and 
large-scale conflicts (United Nations, 2018). The efforts that active conflicts require in all 
senses decreases the possibilities of focusing on prevention, even though these efforts 
could be reduced if they were “able to focus on prevention” (Roberts, 2017). 
The tipycal dynamics of international power relations can also influence the success or 
failure of prevention. Thus, for example, it is important to take into account the 
reluctance of some countries concerning the limits of sovereignty or that the Council 
Security's “interest in acting in a preventive capacity [is] already limited in cases when 
a powerful member was involved in a looming conflict” (Roberts, 2017). Other aspects 
have to do with “the difficulty in […] demonstrating that a given action resulted in conflict 
not taking place” (United Nations, 2018, p.1). 
Thus, as Stephanie Sugars (2017) points out, so that the enthusiasm that Guterres is 
demonstrating translates into success, it is necessary “a fundamental break with the UN's 
current approach, not to mention sizeable reforms to address the body's its sluggish 
response time to conflicts [or] its burgeoning bureaucracy”. 
Added to this, it is the lack of political will to deploy measures that respond early to 
alerts. Several authors (Stanton, 2005; Wulf & Debiel, 2009; Evans, 2016) have indicated 
that political will is the key, either for the time to develop an accurate analysis, for not 
being aware of the type of skills needed to handle the problem, or for the lack of interest 
in specific topics or regions. 
These obstacles, which make it difficult to carry out measures with a preventive effect, 
could be overcome or reduced, to some extent, if the prevention of conflicts is further 
promoted by regional organizations. 
 
3. Regionalization as an opportunity: taking advantage of local actors to 
promote prevention 
The regionalization of security, a trend that has gained importance in the last three 
decades (Berman, 2002; Francis, 2006; Moller, 2009), could help to encourage conflict 
prevention. It is increasingly common for regional bodies, as ECOWAS, to assume the 
management of their peace and security problems, through the development of new 
policies and mechanisms (Tavares, 2009). The region of West Africa encompasses a 
series of security threats that can have a destabilization effect throughout the region ‒
as it occurs with terrorism and organized crime, or with climate change and violence 
related to resource scarcity. This produces a security interdependence, since national 
security concerns of West African states are very similar and are so close that they can 
not be addressed indpendently (Persson, 2012). Thus, regional problems are managed 
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from a regional co-operation (Buzan, Waever & Wilder, 2003) under the ECOWAS 
architecture. 
The involvement of regional organizations in security issues has significant advantages, 
such as a better knowledge of the context and of the causes of conflict. They are actors 
who know the terrain better so they understand the situation from another perspective 
and have a direct interest in the repercussions and solutions of the conflict. Moreover, 
“regional political actors [...] have both greater legitimacy and a much greater political 
stake in taking a diplomatic lead” (Gowan, 2017, p.6). 
Consequently, regional and local actors, with the support of the international community, 
play a leading role in conflict prevention. As Guterres has outlined, regional organizations 
are essential actors in conflict prevention and resolution, in peace operations and 
promotion of development and human rights (United Nations, 2016, p.4). 
However, this option is not always the best. One of the problem is the competition 
between some regional actors that can affect prevention success. For instance, the 
traditional rivalry of Nigeria and South Africa “have prevented consensus within the AU 
on key preventive diplomacy efforts” (Hara, 2011). The leadership role developed by 
Nigeria has awakened mistrust in other ECOWAS members at different conflictual 
situations, like the civil wars of Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adebajo, 2002), which has 
made difficult to come to an agreement within the regional organization.  
Furthermore, personal ties between political leaders determinate the position that 
governments adopt in the face of a crisis, therefore there is not impartiality. This has 
occured in several ocassions within ECOWAS. While overwhelming measures were taken 
after the coups d’État in Guinea in 2008 or in the Gambian context in 2017, a weaker 
attitude has been shown during the recent crisis in Togo (RFI Afrique, 2017)4. Different 
reactions are explained by the individual interests of each Member State, which have 
diverse strategic views that hinder a common decision-making and effective responses. 
Thus, this clash of interests can be detrimental to the advance of the empowerment of 
regional organizations in sensitive issues like security. 
Moreover, regional actors like ECOWAS have shortage of material, financial and human 
resources, showing a dependence on external actors that limits the success of security 
regionalization. In this sense, the African continent is one of the priorities for the UN. The 
organization is aware of the need to cooperate with Africa’s regional organizations for the 
promotion of preventive measures; this cooperation is essential to overcome the lack of 
resources. Accordingly, the UN “reaffirms its intention to consider further steps to 
promote closer and more operational cooperation between the United Nations and 
regional and subregional organizations in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding” (United Nations, 2014b). In 2002 the Ad hoc Working 
Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa was created (United Nations, 2002). 
More recently, it was established a Cluster on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management 
by the UN Office for the African Union (UNOAU), which is a strategic partnership in conflict 
prevention and mediation, working “throughout all phases of the conflict cycle”, between 
the UN and the AU (United Nations Office to the African Union, n.d.). 
Cooperation between different actors in the field of peace and security has been a trend 
that has evolved and grown. That implies sometines an “institutional overlap of actors” 
                                                     
4 These cases will be addresseed in a later section. 
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which “operate and intervene in the same geographical area […] in the same crisis at the 
same time or replacing each other” (Sousa, 2017, p.572). Thus, a lack of alignment is 
frequent as well as a tendency for divergence, contradictions and duplicity of efforts and 
resources. Africa has been setting of disputes between the UN, the AU, and the regional 
organizations (Nathan, 2017, p.151). 
Operations launched by regional organizations need authorization by the Security Council 
prior to deployment (UN Charter, Chapter VIII, Art. 53), causing in many ocassions 
“disagreements […] at various levels of decision-making” between the UN and the AU 
(Desmidt & Hauck, 2017, p.15), but also with ECOWAS, which does “not explicitly 
acknowledge the supremacy of the UNSC [the United Nations Security Council] if it comes 
to peace and security” (Jetschke & Schlipphak, 2019, p.4). As Williams has highlighted 
(2017, p.129), it is necessary that “the UN develops appropriate support mechanisms” 
for regional organizations in Africa, especially because of the lack of “predictable, 
sustainable, and flexible funding” they have (Williams, 2017, p.129). 
At the same time, divergence appears between the AU and the regional organizations, 
like ECOWAS, where a “lack of clarity on subsidiarity and division of labor […] often lead 
to ad-hoc and pragmatic solutions” (Desmidt, 2019, p.2), affecting the deployment of 
preventive measures. From the AU, the concept of primacy is standed up (Desmidt, 2019, 
p.4), however, the principle of subsidiarity “states that responses to conflict should be 
formulated by organizations with closest proximity” (Desmidt, 2019, p.12); thus, as 
Nathan (2017, p.157) has highlighted, policy documents “are ambiguous or 
contradictory” when tackling crisis management.  
On the whole, although security regionalization offers a great opportunity to encourage 
conflict prevention policies, there is still a dependence on external actors. This has caused 
an overlap and confusion between all stakeholders that intervene in a crisis, difficulting 
the capacity of action to intervene or act preventively. 
 
4. The experience of ECOWAS in conflict prevention  
The West African region is a great example to analyse these issues, since it has 
experienced an interesting process of security regionalization and has also lived 
interventions from different actors.  
This region has attracted a great interest and concern, due to the number of conflicts 
that have been in the area. For this reason, in 2000, a regional conflict resolution office 
was established in Senegal, currently the United Nations Office for West Africa and the 
Sahel (UNOWAS5), whose objectives are to develop regional diplomacy to manage 
political instability within the region (Gowan, 2017, p.9). UNOWAS has developed 
activities coordinated with ECOWAS, specially in the field of conflict prevention. This 
collaborative work had had great results in the cases of Guinea or Burkina Faso, for 
example. 
The area of West Africa has also been selected because interesting lessons can be 
obtained from the activities related to conflict prevention of its regional organization. 
Undoubtedly, the model developed by ECOWAS is the most interesting example in the 
                                                     
5 Before known as the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). 
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continent (Wulf & Debiel, 2009). 
At the end of 1990, the organization adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (The 
Mechanism), agreed on the Lome Summit on 10 December 1999, which is “the most 
important legal and normative instrument for ECOWAS in all matters relating to peace 
and security” (ECOWAS, 2018, p.16). 
This legal instrument demonstrates that the prevention of conflicts acquires a great 
importance for the organization, since among the objectives of the Mechanism are the 
prevention of: internal and inter-State conflicts; serious and massive violations of human 
rights; or an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government. 
A next step was the approval of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 
adopted on 21 December 2001 and signed in Dakar, with the goal of incorporating 
provisions regarding topics such as prevention of internal crises (United Nations, n.d.).  
The most recent agreement on preventive policies has been the ECOWAS Conflict 
Prevention Framework (ECPF), adopted by the Mediation and Security Council (the 
central organ of the Mechanism) on January 16 2008, in Ouagadougou. The ECPF sought 
to be the definitive impulse for the prevention of conflicts, acting as an strategic 
framework for conflict prevention and human security and looking for a more pro-active 
and operational conflict prevention posture from Member States (ECOWAS, 2008, p.12).  
Finally, as a result of the agreements reached after the launch of the ECPF, in 2015 the 
ECOWAS Mediation Facilitation Division (MFD) was established under the Directorate of 
Political Affairs, with the aim of promoting preventive diplomacy in the region (ECOWAS, 
2018). 
This legal framework places ECOWAS as one of the most advanced regional organizations 
of Africa in conflict prevention. However, more than a decade after the ECPF was adopted, 
there are important constraints that limit its potential on the ground. The ECPF is an 
structure that is still in the course of being implemented and needs a long process of 
operationalization. One of the main challenges is the lack of funding, which depends on 
Member States (“Peace building experts, others, urge ECOWAS to animate the 
implementation of its Conflict Prevention Framework”, 2019). The limited human and 
financial resources affect the development of the framework and makes the regional 
organization has to select in what contexts or in what situations intervene. Thus, in a 
region where there are significant challenges to peace and security, the lack of resources 
makes some risk factors do not get enough attention and that the actions focus on the 
most immediate threats (Yabi, 2010, p.55). 
Together with resources constraints, there are other obstacles that conditionate the 
implementation of conflict prevention in the region, which will be analyse in the next 
section. 
 
Prevention on the ground 
Under this normative framework that has evolved and adapted to the changes and needs 
of the region's security scenario, ECOWAS has developed an important activity in 
preventive diplomacy and mediation in different contexts. With the objective of 
illustrating the conflict prevention policies of ECOWAS, somes cases of study have been 
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selected (Table 1), analysing factors like the different contexts in which preventive 
measures were developed, the actors who participated together with ECOWAS or the 
type of actions that those actors carried out. 
 
Table 1. Case studies of ECOWAS conflict prevention measures 
Cases6 Type of conflict Preventive measures 
Liberia (1989) Escalation to civil war 
Diplomatic and mediation 
efforts 
Military intervention 
Guinea (2008) Coup d’État 
Institutional incentives 
Imposition of sanctions 
Suspension of Guinea as a 
member of ECOWAS 
Côte d’Ivoire (2010) Electoral violence 
Suspension of Côte d’Ivoire 
as a member of ECOWAS 
Imposition of sanctions 
Sent of diplomatic 
delegations 
Threat of use of force 
Burkina Faso (2014) Public demostrations 
Imposition of sanctions 
Arms embargo 
Early warning mission 
The Gambia (2016) Electoral violence 
Diplomatic and mediation 
efforts 
Preventive deployment 
Togo (2017) Public demonstrations 
Mediation efforts 
Monitoring activities 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Due to the theoretical framework that has been established to analyze the evolution of 
conflict prevention doctrine in this article begins with the end of the Cold War, the first 
selected case of analysis is Liberia (1989). It is, moreover, the first civil war in the region 
that test the ECOWAS crisis management capacities.  
The first Liberian civil war began when rebels led by Charles Taylor crossed the border 
from Côte d’Ivoire to fight against Samuel Doe's government. At that time, the legal 
instruments7 used by ECOWAS did not contemplate the prevention of internal conflicts, 
but rather between States. Some of the first steps made by the regional organization 
were focus on diplomatic attempts, creating the Standing Committee on Mediation in May 
1990 (Suifon, n.d., p.3). However, those efforts failed and ECOWAS decided to act 
because the crisis was considered a regional problem (Human Rights Watch, 1993).  
Despite the fact that ECOWAS intervention occured once the war has broken out –that is 
why the intervention was considered “largely reactive” (ECOWAS, 2018, p.35)– it was 
the only actor who adopted an active attitude in the conflict and, as some authors have 
pointed out, the military intervention was successful “at lease for a short period, 
preventing the situation from degenerating into genocidal proportions” like that of 
                                                     
6 The dates that are included in parentheses reflect the year in which the violence begins. 
7 At that time only existed the Protocol on Non-Aggression of 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on 
Defense of 1981. 
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Rwanda (Draman & Carment, 2003, p.17). 
Another example is the crisis opened in Guinea with the Lansana Conté’s succession. 
After his death, in December 2008, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara and fellow military 
officers led a coup d’État. The situation started worsening when he decided to present 
himself to next presidential election, an announcement that provoked strong protests in 
September 2009 that culminated with the massacre occured at the National Stadium of 
Conakry, committed by soldiers under the command of the military junta (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009). The government received “pressure and incentives [by ECOWAS] to allow 
elections to take place and to enable an international investigation into the massacre 
(Day & Pichler Fong, 2017, p.8). 
Both ECOWAS and the AU used coercitive tools, such as the imposition of sanctions and 
the suspension of Guinea as member of the regional organization. Moreover, there was 
an important external pressure and preventive measures like threats of prosecution by 
the International Criminal Court were used (Day & Pichler Fong, 2017, p.7). This had an 
effective effect on some fellows of Camara, who suffered an assassination attempt that 
forced his leave, facilitating the transition to civilian rule. 
The UN also took a preventive attitude in this crisis through its regional office, UNOWAS 
(then the United Nations Office for West Africa –UNOWA), and the Regional Coordinator, 
who developed “intensive preventive diplomacy efforts” (Von Einsiedel et al., 2018, 
p.15), acting as mediator with different stakeholders. Moreover, UNOWA provided 
logistical and technical support to ECOWAS, that had the real leadership as mediator, 
and more particularly, one of its Member States, Burkina Faso, whose president 
convinced the transitional goverment to organize elections. Thus, “the engagement of 
ECOWAS […] was largely considered a successful effort to avert further violence or 
escalation to civil war” (Hara, 2011).  
Another interesting experience for the regional organization was the civil war that arises 
in Côte d'Ivoire after the 2010’s presidential elections. While the Electoral Commission, 
as well as the international community, declared Alassane Ouattara the winner, Laurent 
Gbagbo refused to accept the result as the Constitutional Council announced that he was 
the real victor because he had obtained a larger percentage than his rival (Cook, 2011). 
Given this scenario, ECOWAS asked the parties to respect the results and to celebrate an 
extraordinary meeting, although they clearly showed their support for Ouattara.  
Some of the first steps taken by the regional organization were the suspension of Côte 
d'Ivoire as a member at the beginning of December, in addition to the UA, forcing Gbagbo 
to accept the results (Cook, 2011) and the imposition of sanctions, following article 45 
of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Both organizations sent diplomatic 
delegations, such as the one led by the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, 
who traveled to the country to make a generic call for peace and democracy, but without 
issuing an important statement (Al Jazeera, 2010).   
In the absence of action of the UN ‒that received a lot of criticism from different 
organizations for its  indifference‒ ECOWAS decided to take action. At the end of 
December 2010, ECOWAS gave an ultimatum to Gbagbo, using the threat of the use of 
force, that was ignored it, for which the organization found itself without options, and 
had to contemplate other measures, including the use of force (Cook, 2011). On 
December 31, a Nigerian defense spokesman announced that ECOWAS military chiefs 
from several member countries had “prepared plans to ‘forcefully take over power’ from 
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Gbagbo using a grouping of troops called the ECOWAS standby force […] if diplomatic 
efforts to pressure him to cede the presidency fail” (Cook, 2011, p.39). However, military 
intervention was finally conducted “by French, UN and pro-Ouattara ‘Republican’ forces” 
(Yabi, 2012, p.3). 
Despite the slowness with which preventive measures were carried out and despite the 
external dependence to act, as some studies point out, it is interesting to highlight that 
the second civil war in the Côte d’Ivoire would be one of the clearest examples in which 
ECOWAS made use of preventive diplomacy (Kwabena, 2015). 
The following example is found in Burkina Faso, which in 2014 experienced a stage of 
public opposition due to President’s intentions to extend his term limit. This provoked 
mass demonstrations that led to the resignation of then-President Blaise Compaoré 
(Taoko, Cowell & Callimachi, 2014). Subsequently there was an attempted coup d'État 
against the transition authorities.  
There were important preventive measures, such as the imposition of sanctions asked 
by ECOWAS to the AU (“UNOWA head Mohammed Ibn Chambas to brief on Burkina Faso”, 
2015), who also “decided to suspend the participation of Burkina Faso from all AU 
activities” (Desmidt, 2019, p.12). As some studies have pointed out (Day & Pichler Fong, 
2017, p.7), these pressures were one of the key factors for “averting further chaos and 
a high risk of violence”. ECOWAS decided to impose an arms embargo in September 
(“ECOWAS arms embargo on Guinea”, n.d.).  
Moreover, civil society organizations played an important preventive role in the crisis, 
since they organized several workshops throughout the previous year of the elections on 
monitoring and preventing violence, in which politicians and media were involved. 
Despite these preventive measures, Compaoré refused to leave the power, and ECOWAS 
decided to intervene together with UNOWA and deployed a joint early warning mission 
with the aim of promoting a national dialogue between national political actors and civil 
society. However, the president kept strong while tensions continued rising. This 
provoked a new intervention of both actors to which the AU decided to join.  
Finally, joint efforts resulted in “a new Constitution and a one-year civilian-led transition 
that would culminate with general elections in November 2015” (United Nations, 2018, 
p.6). The support of ECOWAS and its mediation efforts during the transition period were 
key for the successful of the national dialogue. Equally important was the collaborations 
with UNOWA, that gave its support to the regional organization, and with the AU, since 
in spite of initial disagreements, in the end there was a collaborative work. 
The same circumstances occured in The Gambia at the end of 2016, when President 
Yahya Jammeh refused to accept his defeat in the December elections. This provoked a 
climate of tension in the country that led ECOWAS to get involved, initiating diplomatic 
and mediation work with President Jammeh to accept the results of the elections 
(ECOWAS, 2017). There were several occasions in which the leaders of the region met 
with both Jammeh and the elected president, Adama Barrow (Alfa Shaban, 2017).   
Before considering a preventive deployment, ECOWAS’ Members developed mediation 
efforts through high-level delegation visits in December 2016 (Desmidt, 2019, p.7). 
Finally, ECOWAS decided to intervene on January 19 2017 according with the Article 25 
of the ECOWAS Mechanism and with the support of the UN and the AU (Day & Pichler 
Fong, 2017). The deployment of the ECOMIG would be applauded by the international 
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community (Alfa Shaban, 2017). The good coordination between the UN and ECOWAS 
was reflected by the role played by UNOWAS, that held “meetings with representatives 
of the government, opposition parties, civil society and women and youth organizations” 
(“Peaceful and credible elections: A case of UNOWAS’ holistic coordination”, 2017, p.7). 
The Gambia has been an example of the success of ECOWAS preventive policies and 
could be highlighted as a paradigm for future crises in the region; this preventive 
deployment has served to prevent a post-electoral context of tension leading to an 
escalation of violence.  
Anti-government protests were also echoed in another country of the region, Togo, where 
at the end of August 2017 a wave of demonstrations demanding constitutional reforms 
and the resignation of the President Faure Gnassingbé Eyadéma8 broken out, which were 
harshly repressed (RFI Afrique, 2017). The regional organization called then for peace 
“upon all political stakeholders and the people of Togo to exercise restraint and refrain 
from violence, and dialogue in order to preserve peace” (RFI Afrique, 2017). 
ECOWAS’ countries intervened, beginning a dialogue process between the ruling party 
and the opposition that was initiated with the Presidents of Ghana and Guinea as the lead 
mediators (United Nations, 2017b). Within ECOWAS, there was satisfaction for the 
preventive efforts made by these two leaders (“ECOWAS hails Akufo-Addo, Alpha Condé 
over Togo intervention”, 2018). The regional organization set the celebration of 
parliamentary elections on December 2018. For that purpose, the “organization urged 
the Togolese government to proceed with the complete revision of the electoral roll prior 
to these legislative” (Gbenyedji, 2018). Parliamentary elections were finally celebrated 
on December 20, with a victory of the ruling party, who ignored the recommendations 
from the regional organization. 
 
5. Conclusiones 
These contexts of political and social instability are some examples in which the 
preventive tools of ECOWAS and its coordination with other actors have been tested as 
well as they have served to improve the management of its security challenges. Through 
the study of these cases, it has been possible to see some of the tools the organization 
can use to prevent conflicts, such as preventive diplomacy –through mediation and 
dialogue between the parties–, the imposition of sanctions, the suspension from 
membership of a Member State, or the threat of the use of force as a deterrent. The 
analysis of these experiences showed that ECOWAS has had an important activity on 
conflict prevention. 
But these experiences have also revealed the main challenges that the organization face 
in terms of prevention. Crises such as the one currently taking place in Togo or past 
cases like Côte d’Ivoire have revealed the vulnerabilities of its policies.  
Some of the main obstacles detected in the ECOWAS conflict prevention policies can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, there is a group of factors related to aspects like the fight 
for political power, the personal relationships, or typical dynamics of power structures. 
Within this group is the divergence of stakeholder’s interests. As it has been observed, 
the agents involved in those scenarios maintained different attitudes to the crises. This 
                                                     
8 His family is the longest in a West African government. 
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lack of agreement or understanding among crucial actors explains the slowness with 
which the measures were applied once the early warnings were identified.  
The clash of interest between ECOWAS Member States was present during the First 
Liberian War. Nigeria wanted to play a leadership role while the government of Burkina 
Faso had personal interest in the crisis due to his ties with Liberian dissidents (Murison, 
2004, 603), which affected the decision-making.  
There have also been clashes of interests between the regional organization and the 
continental organization, the AU, which had repercussions on the ground, turning the 
decision-making about the management of crises difficult. During the previous context 
of the Liberian civil war, for example, the countries of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), predecessor of the AU, showed a different position than the one that ECOWAS 
had. The OAU was opposed to a military intervention in Liberia, especially those countries 
that supported Charles Taylor, the rebel leader (Wippman, 1993, p.165). This lack of a 
common action between the two organizations was also present in the Côte d’Ivoire’s 
electoral crisis of 2010, since within the AU there were disparity of positions on the 
support to the two political leaders, Ouattara and Gbagbo, ECOWAS kept a posture of 
unity. 
Moreover, partiality was present in some cases. Some of the Member States of ECOWAS 
had significant influence in the political context of Côte d’Ivoire, such as the president of 
Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, who could have put more pressure on the parties. The 
role played by his government was seen as not neutral by other ECOWAS Member States, 
since he “has been strongly identified as an ally of Ouattara and accused of being a key 
mover behind the initial insurgency in [Côte d’Ivoire] in September 2002” (The Guardian, 
2011). This lack of impartiality existed also in Togo. One of the main obstacles for the 
dialogue experts saw (RFI Afrique, 2017) was that the presdient of Togo had been 
chairman of ECOWAS for one-year, until June 2018. This is an important factor to 
consider, since the regional organization was not revealing a neutral position to this crisis 
and there was a certain lack of political will to act. As some organizations have described, 
there was abuse of power and dictatorial measures during the electoral contexts (Bailey, 
2019), but both ECOWAS and the AU have call the elections as “free and transparent” 
(“Togo President's Party Wins Majority in Parliament”, 2018).  
Added to this, it is the lack of political will to deploy measures. A clear example is Guinea, 
since despite the successul final result, with a pacific transitional government, it is 
necessary to highlight that the crisis and specially the deaths of civilians could have been 
prevented if stakeholders, mainly ECOWAS, had reacted more immediately to the coup 
d'État. Thus, between the coup d’État and the massacre of September 2009 some other 
measures could have been used, such as imposition of sanctions and an arms embargo, 
which were launched immediately after the high death of civilians. 
In addition, contradictions often occur in the approaches and functions to be performed 
when collaborating with the AU. Strong disagreements between both organizations were 
presented during the crisis in Burkina Faso. However, there are some examples in which 
the cooperation between them had positive impacts on the ground, like in Guinea o The 
Gambia (Kreß & Nußberger, 2017).  
Secondly, it is neccessary to have in mind a group of factors related to more operational 
or logistic aspects that are present in organizations like ECOWAS, like the complex 
bureaucracy, which makes decision-making difficult, and prolongs the time that elapses 
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from the decision to implement a preventive measure up to the application of that 
measure. In addition, this sometimes makes it difficult to design  a strategic approach 
(Yabi, 2010, p.13), as it occured, for example, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. At the end of 
2010, when the electoral crisis was driving to an escalation of violence, ECOWAS threated 
with the use of force, but in January the mission had not been yet launched, so the 
suspicion was confirmed that an intervention by force would be difficult to deploy since 
it lacked a plan and it would require additional resources (Kwabena, 2015, p.32).  
This last aspect is a very important constraint that has been present in all the cases 
analysed in this article. The lack of human and financial resources in ECOWAS makes it 
has dependency on the external ators to be able to intervene preventively. 
Finally, it is important to highlight the need to incorporate the work of civil society 
organizations (CSO), as it has been underlined in recent political meetings (“Peace 
building experts, others, urge ECOWAS to animate the implementation of its Conflict 
Prevention Framework”, 2019). Collaboration between ECOWAS and CSO has proved to 
be very useful in contextst such as Burkina Faso (Somé, 2014).  
In conclusion, the organization still has a long way to go to become an effective actor, 
given the complexity of the challenges it faces, many of which do not only have an 
internal character, but also feed on external factors. Currently, it seems that regional 
political actors in West Africa have a commitment to implement the organization's 
framework of action in conflict prevention (African Media Agency, 2019; “Peace building 
experts, others, urge ECOWAS to animate the implementation of its Conflict Prevention 
Framework”, 2019). Thanks to the management developed in cases such as The Gambia, 
ECOWAS has received the applause from the international community. This regional actor 
plays undoubtedly a key role in implementing conflict prevention and among its priorities 
it is to continue developing and improving preventive policies (“ECOWAS launches Plans 
of Action for its Conflict Prevention Framework”, 2019). The history of this regional 
organization offers interesting lessons on the importance that the regionalization of 
security has for the African continent, where conflict prevention could become the main 
challenge. 
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